Malaysia: Consensus on ‘social contract’ imperative

Clive Kessler

The nature of the current disagreement about “the social contract” should be clearly identified.

Nobody is seriously suggesting that “the social contract” be repudiated, set aside, rejected. Nobody is arguing that it is fictive, a pure fantasy, an illusion. On all sides, everyone in their own way is arguing that it should be honoured, respected and upheld.

People just need to be clear, and find a way to agree, what its terms were, what “upholding the social contract” means and entails.

People broadly agree that in the years between 1955 and 1957 certain basic inter-ethnic or inter-communal understandings were reached. Through them a national “accord” was solemnly affirmed and politically “enshrined” that made the nation possible.

Known informally in earlier times as “the Merdeka agreements” or “Merdeka understandings”, these were subsequently, in the 1980s, relabeled, or as people now say “rebranded” with a new identity as “the social contract”.

Embodied within the constitution, these agreements – this national “accord” or inter-communal “compact” – became the foundation of Malayan, and later Malaysian, nationhood.

Within the current debates, people on both sides of this question broadly agree on this.

There is basic disagreement, however, about what those agreements were, what they provided, what their terms precisely specified.

In retrospect, different parties have construed them differently and have, at times, enlarged or “inflated” the import of those parts of the agreements, or their preferred notions of them, that they found congenial, that seemed to their sectional political liking.

There is now an urgent need for people on both, indeed all, sides of this question – and all Malaysians generally – to understand what exactly those agreements now designated as “the social contract” in fact were.

Malaysians need to reach a historically well-founded consensus concerning “the social contract”, what its terms were at the nation’s formative moment and in its founding experience, and what it means today and for the future. The coherence, strength and political sustainability of the nation require no less.

‘Ketuanan Melayu’ not part of the deal

It needs to be widely understood that, whatever they provided and mandated, “Ketuanan Melayu” was not part of what those agreements enshrined.

Any suggestion that Malay political domination in perpetuity, continuing Malay “ethnocratic” ascendancy over other Malayans (and now Malaysians), was any part of those foundational agreements now designated as “the social contract” is simply wrong.

Those who argue to the contrary that Ketuanan Melayu is a constitutionally guaranteed “foundational” component of Malaysia’s national sovereignty and international public identity are disingenuous, mischievous, or simply ill-informed.

The attempt to “read back” subsequent notions of Ketuanan Melayu into ideas of “the social contract” and in that way to embed them within newly fashioned but quite dubious views of the constitution is simply an exercise in anachronistic revisionism.

It is the duty of serious historians and legal scholars to say so.

CLIVE S KESSLER is emeritus professor of sociology and anthropology at the School of Social Science and International Studies at the University of New South Wales in Australia.

MC

07/11/10