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Malaysia’s Recent Elections Signal a Shift Away from Race-Only Politics By John Tribbett

Malaysia’s Parliament convened April 28 to swear in lawmakers who emerged victorious in March in an historic election that provided a long-overdue jolt to the entrenched racial politics and policies of Malaysia.

The election saw the Opposition alliance, steered by the defacto leader, former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, deny Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s Barisan Nasional coalition a two-thirds majority for the first time since 1969. The Opposition also claimed five state assemblies in the face of Barisan Nasional’s worst showing since it came to power as the colonial period ended over half a century ago.

The victorious Barisan Nasional alliance is made up of a variety of racially based parties dominated by the United Malays National Organization, or UMNO. While the Opposition is a hodge-podge of political ideologies that campaigned on a colorblind agenda to help all Malaysians: an Islamist party that has temporarily shelved its Sharia Law aspirations while continuing to speak out against the dangers of reality television, an economically-geared progressive party dominated by ethnic-Chinese, and Anwar Ibrahim’s multi-racial and liberally minded Parti Keadilan Rakyat.

Many of the political parties in Malaysia are direct descendents of the British colonial system that kept racial groups divided as a means to maximize control and economic gains. Traditionally, parties represent each of the countries three main racial groups: ethnic-Malays, who are Muslim by law, comprise some 60 percent of the population, ethnic-Chinese make up about 25 percent, and ethnic-Indians constitute around 8 percent.

In the weeks leading up to the election, the government controlled mainstream media made not-so-subtle illusions to the deadly 1969 race riots that gripped Malaysia after the opposition parties of the day made significant gains. During the riots, the Malay majority—upset with both ethnic-Chinese electoral victories and economic successes—largely instigated the violence.

The specter of 1969 is frequently conjured when the rule of Barisan Nasional is under threat. The storyline goes: racial riots will spontaneously break out if the status quo of the benevolent-ruling-coalition-that-has-everyone’s-best-interest-in-mind is ever shaken. Sometimes the threat is not one of spontaneous upheaval, but of direct action, such as during the 2006 UMNO general assembly when a delegate ritualistically kissed the keris (a Malay dagger) and threats of bathing in blood to protect race and religion were uttered.

But the significance of the 1969 riots goes beyond the politics of fear. It was in the wake of the riots that a series of economic policies designed to elevate the largely rural and poorly educated Malay population by guaranteeing access in business, civil services, and education were instigated. The race-based system also helped to appease the Malay powerbase of the ruling coalition.

These policies extended the bumiputra, or sons of the soil, protections enshrined in Malaysia’s 1957 constitution. This was a sort of gentlemen’s agreement aimed at preserving peace among the various racial groups when the British pulled out for good. The Malays, who feared being dominated by the mass of Chinese and Indian workers brought in during the colonial years, were reassured the country belonged to them. The others were granted citizenship at their bequest.

While it is arguable that through the ensuing decades these policies—ostensibly designed to create economic and social parity among the races—have elevated certain sectors of the Malay population and that Malaysia has been able to maintain a remarkable degree of racial harmony while experiencing a truly exemplary rise in living standards, education, infrastructure, and overall modernization, these policies have also deteriorated and morphed into a culture of entitlement, cronyism, nepotism, and corruption among certain sectors of the population. While they have brought many forward, others have been left behind with a bitter sense of impotence in the face of official policies based on race. Evidence of this frustration surfaced last year when ethnic Indians, under the banner of the Hindu Rights Action Force, engaged in large-scale street protests in Kuala Lumpur.

In many ways, this election was a referendum on the societies desire to carry these policies forward. But it also brought to the fore a deeper, but rarely articulated question, about identity: is Malaysia an Islamic country belonging to the Malays that allows the Chinese, Indian, and other populations to have citizenship of a second class nature; or is Malaysia a multi-ethnic democratic state that belongs to all citizens equally and is governed by the rule of law?

The recent elections point towards a shift to the latter.
It should be duly noted that riots did not break out in the aftermath of a major upset to the status quo. In fact, there are signs the status quo has taken notice of the shift. In the weeks that followed, the Prime Minister announced a major cabinet reshuffling, initiated preliminary steps towards strengthening the beleaguered judiciary, and reiterated the need for the ruling government to focus on the people’s problems, with particular attention to low-income earners—apparently referring to those of all races. No doubt part political triage, they were still steps in the right direction.

Most importantly, in order for the Opposition to have made such tremendous gains, many Malaysians, of all backgrounds, including Malays, had to cross the most difficult of all boundaries to cast their vote—that of racial separation.

John Tribbett
Asian American Press

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