Last Sunday, I woke up in Durham, North Carolina to the news that BN was on its way to victory in the Hulu Selangor by-election with a small majority of approximately 1,500 votes. The final majority was 1,725 in BN’s favour.
A week later, as I sit here in Petaling Jaya, I’m still somewhat surprised, perhaps not so much by the fact that BN has emerged victorious in this crucial by-election but by the way in which this seat was won.
I had earlier predicted, with some confidence, that PKR’s Zaid Ibrahim would win this tough and hard fought race by a margin of between 1,000 to 1,500 votes.
My prediction was based on the following three assumptions in regard to racial voting: (1) that BN’s Malay vote share would not exceed 60%, (2) that its Indian vote share would not exceed 50%, and (3) that its Chinese vote share would not exceed 30%.
The polling station results showed that first two of three assumptions were wrong and that the BN’s Chinese vote share was far below that which was anticipated.
I had anticipated a small swing in the Malay vote in favour of BN, from approximately 55% to 58%. The swing in Malay support is consistent with a larger, national trend of Prime Minister Najib Razak’s increasing popularity among the Malay electorate.
I had assumed that the presence of split voting in favour of Zaid and the control of the Selangor state government by Pakatan would be able to prevent BN’s Malay vote share to rise above 60%. Even the last-minute handouts to the Felda settlers did not alter my assumption since these voters already vote for BN in large numbers in previous elections.
Using returns at the polling station level, I estimated BN’s Malay support at a surprisingly high 66%, still lower than the estimated 70% garnered at the state seat level in 2008, but most definitely higher than the upper limit of 60% that I thought the BN could achieve.
The anticipated Malay/Umno backlash against the selection of an MIC candidate did not materialise. The galvanising of the local Umno machinery in support for the MIC candidate was certainly surprising, especially given the initial poisoned political environment.
Indian and Chinese go separate ways
I had anticipated the unpredictable Indian vote to break in favour of the opposition by a 55% to 45% margin. I would not have been surprised if the Indian support for BN had gone up to 50%. Instead, the BN Indian support went up to approximately 54%.
Again, the Indian backlash from local factions who were supportive of G Palanivel did not occur perhaps because the former Hulu Selangor MP was promised the position of a senator. The enthusiastic and friendly demeanour of the MIC candidate, P Kamalanathan, probably helped swing the BN Indian support above the 50% mark.
Finally, I expected the Chinese vote to swing against the BN to perhaps 30%, a swing of approximately 5%, compared to the 2008 general election. Instead, my estimation of the BN Chinese support dropped to approximately 18%.
This level of Chinese support is reminiscent of the Bukit Gantang by-election, where the PAS candidate and former Perak MB won approximately 80% of the Chinese vote.
While Pakatan was successful in limiting BN’s Malay support in Bukit Gantang to less than 60% – an important factor in accounting for Nizar Jamaluddin’s victory there – it was not able to replicate such a feat in Hulu Selangor. But still, if prior to polling day, someone had said that the BN’s Chinese vote share would fall to 20%, most people would not have anticipated a BN victory.
Finally, a short note on the youth vote. While it is true that BN won the majority of the polling streams where younger voters cast their vote, one has to remember that most of these polling streams were in Malay majority areas.
In other words, it is hard to differentiate the overall Malay swing in favour of BN from a more specific claim that the younger voters were returning to BN in disproportionate numbers.
Furthermore, there was still a significant differential between the levels of BN support among the older and younger Malay voters (even though both groups of voters supported the BN at levels in excess of 50%).
Political repercussions for PKR
I have already said that I would not play the role of Monday morning quarterback and dissect, with a fine-tooth comb, the reasons for BN’s victory (or Pakatan’s loss). I do not find the kitchen-sink approach of throwing out a bunch of non-mutually exclusive factors or reasons particularly helpful, especially when it is difficult to ascertain the magnitude of importance for these factors.
Instead, I will discuss some of the political repercussions of the result, for BN as well as for the opposition.
I have struggled somewhat in deciding whether the Hulu Selangor by-election result was more crucial to the BN or to the opposition. Again, one could make arguments for both sides. My conclusion is that Hulu Selangor hurt the opposition, especially PKR, more so than it benefited BN. I say this for a number of reasons.
Firstly, Zaid Ibrahim, a man whom many thought was capable, in the medium to long term, of possibly leading PKR, if something should happen to Anwar Ibrahim, and by extension, the opposition coalition as a whole, has taken a significant but not mortal hit.
His inability to win over the Malay vote (or at least minimise BN’s gain among the Malays) will certainly have damaged his leadership credentials, especially among the ranks of disgruntled PKR leaders and members, who dislike Zaid for one reason or another.
It is not surprising that Zaid has chosen to contest the Hulu Selangor by-election results since this can potentially create the impression that the contest was won with ill-gotten political advantages and by doing so, salvage some of his political capital.
Zaid is down, but not out for the count. Not yet. He would probably stand a better chance of winning an urban seat in Selangor or Kuala Lumpur in the next general election where the issues which he is best positioned to bring up as a parliamentarian are more valued.
Secondly, the political pressure on Khalid Ibrahim will continue to pile, especially from within the ranks of certain PKR leaders who are hoping that he will be replaced as the menteri besar, sooner rather than later.
Unfortunately, many of these PKR leaders may not have considered the very real possibility that the battle to succeed Khalid may be a lost cause if Pakatan cannot win enough state seats in the next general election to maintain control of the Selangor state government.
Thirdly, the floundering PKR, which has suffered a deluge of defections and resignations since March 2008, did not receive the much-needed confidence boost that it needed as a sign of internal and external validation.
Perhaps, PKR will take this loss as a sign that things cannot proceed as they are within the party. But the post-election blame game has already indicated that this cannot be taken as a given.
Internal weaknesses
Ironically, PKR’s position within Pakatan may take a further hit in the unlikely, but not impossible event, that DAP manages to win the upcoming Sibu by-election.
All eyes will be on PKR to see how they respond to this electoral setback. The perception is that Anwar has somehow lost the plot in managing the party that was set up to champion his cause. The accusations that Anwar is more interested in traveling overseas to rub shoulders with foreign dignitaries than to pull up his sleeves to build his own party from within will undoubtedly continue.
Like it or not, even as PKR matures and new leaders emerge, this party is still Anwar’s to lead. If he can rally the party’s leadership around him, it is still not too late to introduce serious institutional reforms and bring in new blood within PKR in order to strengthen the party for the next general election.
The leadership of PKR would do well if they focused on their own internal weaknesses rather than to blame BN for carrying out the same by-election campaign strategies which have been part and parcel of the BN playbook for the past few decades.
A week later, as I sit here in Petaling Jaya, I’m still somewhat surprised, perhaps not so much by the fact that BN has emerged victorious in this crucial by-election but by the way in which this seat was won.
I had earlier predicted, with some confidence, that PKR’s Zaid Ibrahim would win this tough and hard fought race by a margin of between 1,000 to 1,500 votes.
My prediction was based on the following three assumptions in regard to racial voting: (1) that BN’s Malay vote share would not exceed 60%, (2) that its Indian vote share would not exceed 50%, and (3) that its Chinese vote share would not exceed 30%.
The polling station results showed that first two of three assumptions were wrong and that the BN’s Chinese vote share was far below that which was anticipated.
I had anticipated a small swing in the Malay vote in favour of BN, from approximately 55% to 58%. The swing in Malay support is consistent with a larger, national trend of Prime Minister Najib Razak’s increasing popularity among the Malay electorate.
I had assumed that the presence of split voting in favour of Zaid and the control of the Selangor state government by Pakatan would be able to prevent BN’s Malay vote share to rise above 60%. Even the last-minute handouts to the Felda settlers did not alter my assumption since these voters already vote for BN in large numbers in previous elections.
Using returns at the polling station level, I estimated BN’s Malay support at a surprisingly high 66%, still lower than the estimated 70% garnered at the state seat level in 2008, but most definitely higher than the upper limit of 60% that I thought the BN could achieve.
The anticipated Malay/Umno backlash against the selection of an MIC candidate did not materialise. The galvanising of the local Umno machinery in support for the MIC candidate was certainly surprising, especially given the initial poisoned political environment.
Indian and Chinese go separate ways
I had anticipated the unpredictable Indian vote to break in favour of the opposition by a 55% to 45% margin. I would not have been surprised if the Indian support for BN had gone up to 50%. Instead, the BN Indian support went up to approximately 54%.
Again, the Indian backlash from local factions who were supportive of G Palanivel did not occur perhaps because the former Hulu Selangor MP was promised the position of a senator. The enthusiastic and friendly demeanour of the MIC candidate, P Kamalanathan, probably helped swing the BN Indian support above the 50% mark.
Finally, I expected the Chinese vote to swing against the BN to perhaps 30%, a swing of approximately 5%, compared to the 2008 general election. Instead, my estimation of the BN Chinese support dropped to approximately 18%.
This level of Chinese support is reminiscent of the Bukit Gantang by-election, where the PAS candidate and former Perak MB won approximately 80% of the Chinese vote.
While Pakatan was successful in limiting BN’s Malay support in Bukit Gantang to less than 60% – an important factor in accounting for Nizar Jamaluddin’s victory there – it was not able to replicate such a feat in Hulu Selangor. But still, if prior to polling day, someone had said that the BN’s Chinese vote share would fall to 20%, most people would not have anticipated a BN victory.
Finally, a short note on the youth vote. While it is true that BN won the majority of the polling streams where younger voters cast their vote, one has to remember that most of these polling streams were in Malay majority areas.
In other words, it is hard to differentiate the overall Malay swing in favour of BN from a more specific claim that the younger voters were returning to BN in disproportionate numbers.
Furthermore, there was still a significant differential between the levels of BN support among the older and younger Malay voters (even though both groups of voters supported the BN at levels in excess of 50%).
Political repercussions for PKR
I have already said that I would not play the role of Monday morning quarterback and dissect, with a fine-tooth comb, the reasons for BN’s victory (or Pakatan’s loss). I do not find the kitchen-sink approach of throwing out a bunch of non-mutually exclusive factors or reasons particularly helpful, especially when it is difficult to ascertain the magnitude of importance for these factors.
Instead, I will discuss some of the political repercussions of the result, for BN as well as for the opposition.
I have struggled somewhat in deciding whether the Hulu Selangor by-election result was more crucial to the BN or to the opposition. Again, one could make arguments for both sides. My conclusion is that Hulu Selangor hurt the opposition, especially PKR, more so than it benefited BN. I say this for a number of reasons.
Firstly, Zaid Ibrahim, a man whom many thought was capable, in the medium to long term, of possibly leading PKR, if something should happen to Anwar Ibrahim, and by extension, the opposition coalition as a whole, has taken a significant but not mortal hit.
His inability to win over the Malay vote (or at least minimise BN’s gain among the Malays) will certainly have damaged his leadership credentials, especially among the ranks of disgruntled PKR leaders and members, who dislike Zaid for one reason or another.
It is not surprising that Zaid has chosen to contest the Hulu Selangor by-election results since this can potentially create the impression that the contest was won with ill-gotten political advantages and by doing so, salvage some of his political capital.
Zaid is down, but not out for the count. Not yet. He would probably stand a better chance of winning an urban seat in Selangor or Kuala Lumpur in the next general election where the issues which he is best positioned to bring up as a parliamentarian are more valued.
Secondly, the political pressure on Khalid Ibrahim will continue to pile, especially from within the ranks of certain PKR leaders who are hoping that he will be replaced as the menteri besar, sooner rather than later.
Unfortunately, many of these PKR leaders may not have considered the very real possibility that the battle to succeed Khalid may be a lost cause if Pakatan cannot win enough state seats in the next general election to maintain control of the Selangor state government.
Thirdly, the floundering PKR, which has suffered a deluge of defections and resignations since March 2008, did not receive the much-needed confidence boost that it needed as a sign of internal and external validation.
Perhaps, PKR will take this loss as a sign that things cannot proceed as they are within the party. But the post-election blame game has already indicated that this cannot be taken as a given.
Internal weaknesses
Ironically, PKR’s position within Pakatan may take a further hit in the unlikely, but not impossible event, that DAP manages to win the upcoming Sibu by-election.
All eyes will be on PKR to see how they respond to this electoral setback. The perception is that Anwar has somehow lost the plot in managing the party that was set up to champion his cause. The accusations that Anwar is more interested in traveling overseas to rub shoulders with foreign dignitaries than to pull up his sleeves to build his own party from within will undoubtedly continue.
Like it or not, even as PKR matures and new leaders emerge, this party is still Anwar’s to lead. If he can rally the party’s leadership around him, it is still not too late to introduce serious institutional reforms and bring in new blood within PKR in order to strengthen the party for the next general election.
The leadership of PKR would do well if they focused on their own internal weaknesses rather than to blame BN for carrying out the same by-election campaign strategies which have been part and parcel of the BN playbook for the past few decades.
05/05/10
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