Polarization over race, religion, and reform has afflicted Malaysia for
decades and powerfully shaped its electoral politics. Since the country’s
independence in 1957, its ethnic Malay majority has enjoyed a constitutionally
protected special status, while ethnic minorities have been treated as
second-class citizens. But what makes Malaysia’s polarization so complex is
that two additional cleavages—over religion and competing visions for political
reform—overlap with and often intensify ethnic divides.
Political elites regularly appeal to these divides to mobilize their supporters but also make intermittent efforts to downplay one or more of these fissures, with the aim of winning the “center ground” and securing power.1 Ultimately, however, these polarizing issues have scuttled efforts to reach political compromises, constrained the adoption of much-needed reforms, and fueled political instability. The damaging effects of polarization were evident most recently in February 2020, when sharp, identity-driven divisions contributed to the collapse of the most inclusive, secular government in the country’s history. What is more, although polarization is largely confined to the elite level, it is increasingly permeating Malaysian society, endangering interethnic harmony, and eroding social cohesion.
Roots
Malaysia’s polarization feeds on three primary divisions, each of which
has deep historical roots. The country’s main dividing line is ethnic. Ever
since independence, the dominant narrative of national identity has been that
Malaysia is for the Malays—the country’s largest ethnic group, which comprises
50.8 percent of the population.2 Other
communities—namely the Chinese and Indian Malaysians, whose families immigrated
to the country before independence, and the plethora of smaller indigenous
ethnic groups on the island of Borneo—have not enjoyed equal rights and status
in various ways. The country’s prevailing racial hierarchy has faced repeated
challenges, which have exposed ethnic cleavages and led to different levels of
inclusion over time.
The country’s independence period also saw the emergence of a second divide, this one between Islamists and secularists. Debates over the appropriate role of Islam in public life intensified among Malay elites starting in the 1930s and shaped different conceptions of Malay nationalism. These divisions led Muslim clerics to break off from UMNO and form the Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, or PAS) in 1951. The enduring push for a less secular state has shaped Malaysian politics for decades, sharpening differences over political Islam. At the same time, divisions between Islamists and secularists have reinforced Malaysia’s ethnic polarization. Almost all Malays are Muslim, whereas ethnic minorities predominantly are not, and Islamist groups thus have melded their religious appeals with Malay nationalist messages. Race and religion have increasingly fused, with most (although not all) Malays adopting an Islamist outlook and minority communities being more secular.
These three cleavages—over race, religion, and reform—have intersected
in complex ways over Malaysia’s postindependence history. Over the years, they
have fueled elite divisions and led to shifts in the intensity and dominant
mode of polarization.
INCIPIENT POLARIZATION AFTER INDEPENDENCE (1957–1969)
After Merdeka (independence), Malaysia’s first prime minister, Tunku
Abdul Rahman, led the Alliance, ensuring that all ethnic communities had elite
representation. Nation building overshadowed the divides of race and religion,
and this period was known as one of ethnic harmony in a climate of robust
political freedoms. Furthermore, divisions over the usage of state power had
yet to fully emerge, as state capacity was weak, the postcolonial bureaucracy
was still being developed, and the private sector and commodities were the
country’s main economic drivers.
Race, however, continued to shape the political narrative. Initially,
attention focused on Singapore, which briefly joined the Federation of Malaysia
in 1963. From the outset, there were tensions between Rahman and Singapore’s
prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew. These territories also had different ethnic
compositions, with Singapore being majority Chinese and the federation mostly
Malay. In 1965, however, the Malaysian parliament voted to expel Singapore from
the federation, after personal antagonisms and racial tensions boiled over.6 This turning point intensified racial mobilization
within Malaysia, especially over vernacular education and economic empowerment.
These issues would culminate in the May 1969 postelection race riots, which
reflected deep divisions over the representation of ethnic communities.
ELITE POLARIZATION INTENSIFIES (1969–1999)
The period of emergency rule after May 1969 marked a rupture for
Malaysia. Not only did the special rights of the Malay community become
institutionalized through the idea of ketuanan Melayu and
policies such as the NEP, but the state became a vehicle to maintain ethnic
hierarchies and enrich the Malay elite. Opportunistic political elites played a
central role in aggravating ethnic tensions. Indeed, the 1969 race riots were
as much about elites using race for political ends as about actual racial
grievances.7
A fusion of Malay nationalism and state power shaped the next thirty
years of elite polarization in Malaysia. In the 1970s, the government reframed
policies and spending relating to social development, language, and education
along racial lines. Political representation reflected the new,
institutionalized Malay dominance, as the Alliance became BN, dominated by UMNO
but including a larger range of parties. Malay political power became not a
responsibility earned at the ballot box, but an entitlement to be protected.
The state became the driver of the domestic economy, investing heavily in
infrastructure, expanding government-linked companies, and increasing overall
spending, aided by discoveries of oil and gas deposits. A by-product of this
spending was greater corruption and cronyism, and state resources and positions
became a fount of patronage for the parties in power.
During this period, elite ethnic polarization also became increasingly linked to religious divisions. During the 1970s, as political freedoms were tightened, the only major arena left for political mobilization was religion, a space filled by students engaged in a global Islamic revival. To offset opposition from Islamists, in the early 1980s, the BN government, led by Mahathir Mohamad, coopted the Islamist student leader Anwar Ibrahim. Rather than allowing Islamism to challenge their grip on power, Malay nationalist elites instead made the state a promoter of Islam, massively expanding the country’s religious bureaucracy and blurring the line between religious and secular authority. Ever since, cooperation between Malay nationalists and Islamists has happened regularly, with racial and religious divisions reinforcing one another.
THE OPPOSITION MODERATES (1999–2018)
The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999 dealt a blow to the BN
government and initiated profound changes within Malaysia’s opposition. The
economic contraction provoked elite competition within UMNO and a challenge
against prime minister Mahathir, led by his own deputy, the former student
leader Anwar. In 1998, Anwar was arrested and tried for corruption and sodomy
in a politically motivated trial.
These events sparked Malaysia’s reformasi (reform) movement, which called for better governance, anticorruption measures, greater ethnic inclusion, and political freedoms. The movement transformed the opposition by moving it toward the center and enabling new electoral alliances among the previously fragmented opposition parties. Although race and religion continued to divide Malaysia, the opposition became more inclusive and managed to form a coalition between 2008 and 2015 that included the progressive DAP, former deputy prime minister Anwar’s newly founded reformist People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, or the PKR), and even the Islamist PAS. This diverse coalition began to win elections from 2008 onward, initially taking control of two state governments.
As the opposition gained traction in the center, BN began losing popular support and turned to polarizing tactics to compensate. As UMNO disengaged from its political roots as a mass-membership party and became a vehicle for its elites, it relied ever more on racialized rhetoric.8 Interethnic cooperation within BN fell apart, as non-Malay electoral support collapsed. Furthermore, corruption allegations severely damaged BN and prime minister Najib Razak, who in 2015 was tied to the world’s largest kleptocracy scandal, the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal.9 To hold on to power, Najib tapped into state and 1MDB funds and ratcheted up rhetoric over race and religion. He even argued that reform would threaten businesses tied to the patronage machine. Although Najib had managed to hold onto power in 2013 despite losing the popular vote, in 2018, BN lost power for the first time.
Crucial to the opposition’s success in the 2018 election was the
inclusion of Mahathir, a BN prime minister for more than two decades, within
the opposition’s Alliance of Hope (Pakatan Harapan, or PH). He joined in 2017,
leading a new Malay race-based party along with then former deputy prime
minister Muhyiddin Yassin, who had been sacked for raising concerns about 1MDB
in 2015. Widespread discontent with Najib helped overshadow the divisive issues
of race and religion, and the goal of Najib’s removal became a broad umbrella
for different visions of reform, especially for non-Malay supporters who
envisioned a fairer system. With the promise of a “New Malaysia,” Mahathir
returned to lead the country’s first-ever non-UMNO government.10
DESTABILIZING DIVISIONS AND PH’S DOWNFALL (2018–2020)
In February 2020, after less than two years in power, the PH government
dramatically collapsed, destabilized by internal divisions. As prime minister,
Mahathir was unable or unwilling to leave behind racial politics, respond to
criticisms that he was selling out Islam to the secularists, and engage in
meaningful reform. Anwar’s positions on racial inclusion and secularism also
differed from those of many other coalition partners. Furthermore, even though
personality differences between Mahathir and Anwar and disagreements over power
sharing fueled acrimony, it was the deeply entrenched divisions over governance
that severed, distracted, and delegitimized PH.
Meanwhile, after their devastating defeat in 2018, the Malay nationalists of UMNO joined forces with their erstwhile Islamist foe PAS and began reigniting the country’s polarizing divides. In by-elections, the two parties tapped into Malay resentments over ethnic displacement, stoked antireform resistance, and called for the protection of Islam. Ultimately, they united with disgruntled, less reform-oriented factions within PH to form a new coalition, the National Alliance (Perikatan Nasional, or PN), which took power in March 2020.
Muhyiddin, formerly an UMNO deputy prime minister and home minister in
the PH government, became prime minister at the head of a Malay
ethnonationalist government. He appointed only one minister each from the
country’s two largest ethnic minority communities. PN was not elected, opting
to come to power through the back door with support from those who argued that
power should be overwhelmingly in Malay hands. Casting itself as a
Malay-dominant, pro-Islamist protector, PN sustains itself by appealing to all
three main divisions in society. Yet PN has an untested, razor-thin majority in
parliament and comprises parties that are competing for the same slice of the
electorate. As was the case with PH, the fissures inside the coalition on these
issues contribute to PN’s instability.
The sources of the country’s polarization extend beyond the interests
and strategies of political elites. They involve deep socioeconomic changes
that have contributed to different outlooks within Malaysian society.
A GROWING MIDDLE CLASS
Malaysia’s economic transformation created new constituencies supportive
of reform. As the economy grew by 5 to 7 percent annually on average in the
1980s and 1990s (until the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s), the
middle class expanded, creating a largely urban and cosmopolitan group of
voters who tended to be critical of UMNO’s policies.12 This new middle class comprised not only
ethnic minorities who faced discrimination but also Malays who aspired to be
part of the elite and were shut out. The growth of the middle class also
supported an expansion of civil society, which mobilized around issues such as
corruption, electoral reform, and human rights. Ironically, the economic
changes that BN brought about strengthened the opposition and thereby
intensified political competition.
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND INSECURITY
At the same time, economic inequality, long seen through an ethnic lens,
has fueled support for ethnonationalist appeals. Since 1997, economic divisions
in Malaysia have persisted, and inequalities between ethnic communities have
become an increasingly salient issue.13 A large
share of those deemed to be in the Bottom 40 percent (B40) are economically
insecure, with low wages and high debt. This group is disproportionately
composed of Malays and East Malaysians. Using its ethnonationalist rhetoric,
UMNO has heightened the insecurities of these voters around elections, using
fear to its advantage and reinforcing polarization. BN relied heavily on
support from these lower-class and rural voters, often using its control of
patronage resources to win their votes. These strategies did not work in 2018,
as sharp increases in the cost of living and a series of political scandals
battered the ruling coalition. But UMNO continued to tap effectively into
economic insecurities after PH came into office, as Mahathir’s coalition failed
to address economic inequality. The B40 now comprises the base for the
Muhyiddin government, and this underlying driver of polarization remains
salient.
RELIGIOUS REVIVALISM AND ISLAMIZATION
A religious revival across faiths has reinforced polarization. From the
late 1970s to the present, levels of religiosity within Malaysian society have
been increasing gradually. All the major faiths have strengthened the
organization of their religions, including by politically mobilizing their
faithful, and more children have been segregated from peers of different faiths
through religious schools or home schooling. These shifts have deepened
societal divisions, as religious groups have been mobilized around different
poles and socialized into righteous outlooks in how they engage with the
“other” side.
The expansion of the state’s Islamic bureaucracy since the 1980s has further increased sectarian divisions and amplified the Islamist-secularist divide. Today, the federal Islamic religious department, housed in the prime minister’s office, has an annual budget of approximately $300 million and thousands of staff involved in monitoring social behavior and regulating the economy.14 In public education, religious classes often take up almost half the school day, and students are segregated by religion for these courses, creating resentments. The number of Islamic religious schools has grown exponentially, with many students growing up without friends from other communities.
The state’s administration of Islam has been seen to encroach on the rights of non-Muslims and many Muslims, especially in Muslim minority sects that have been targeted by state authorities. At the same time, the growth of the country’s religious bureaucracy has created a constituency with a vested interest in promoting religion, particularly the conservative interpretations of the faith predominant among state clerics, and thus has enhanced sharp differences between Islamists and secularists.
A FRAGMENTED MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
Another important catalyst extending polarization into Malaysian society
has been changes in the country’s media landscape. Up until 1999, before the
internet age began, the BN-led government controlled the mainstream media and
dominant public narratives. The 1999 election cracked the government’s control
of information, as opposition speeches about reform were emailed over the
internet and in many cases put on CDs to be heard in rural communities. By
2010, the internet was dubbed a “liberation technology,” allowing the
opposition to circumvent the government’s tight media controls.15 In 2013, flush with funds, BN dominated
social media with trolls and targeted communication; in 2018, lacking the same
funds and politically damaged, it was unable to counter the opposition’s savvy
use of social media, including WhatsApp. Social media has enhanced the capacity
of political elites to deliver alternative messages, feeding polarization.
New media platforms have amplified tensions surrounding race and religion as well. In 2013, UMNO used highly emotive messaging to convince citizens that voting against the party was selling out their community and religion, both of which needed to be protected. Increasingly, Malaysian citizens get their news from echo chambers that reflect and reinforce their own side of the country’s polarized split.
WEAK POLITICAL PARTIES
The weakness of Malaysian political parties has exacerbated
polarization, as party leaders have turned to divisive rhetoric to compensate
for their loss of grassroots connections and patronage resources after 2018.
The country’s political parties have always been leader-centric, but campaigns
from 2004 onward have become more “presidential” and professional, less
connected to Malaysian society through personal ties and networks. Political
parties have relied more on polarizing tactics to maintain their bases,
demonizing the other side to hold on to support. Messages surrounding traditional
divides of race, religion, and reform are much easier to deliver than a clear
policy program, and fueling discontent is simpler than engaging with Malaysia’s
diversity. Common slogans such as “Anything but UMNO,” “No DAP [Chinese],”
“Save Malaysia [from Najib and UMNO],” and “Protect Islam” have effectively
tapped into the insecurities and righteous indignation that have taken root
throughout the country.
CONSEQUENCES
Malaysia has been reaping the consequences of elite polarization for
decades.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
The collapse of PH in February 2020 showcases the debilitating effects
of elite polarization, as deep distrust and divisions between parties caused
the government to fall apart. Political fragmentation over race, religion, and
reform has made postelection coalitions less stable, because polarization
narrows the number of politically viable partners and thus constrains the range
of possible alliances. The instability of coalition governments means that the
attention of officeholders centers on political survival rather than policy
solutions to address the country’s challenges. Given this insecurity, the
default option for parties is to use polarization to reenergize their
traditional political bases, a strategy that perpetuates polarization.
Political fragmentation over race, religion, and reform has made postelection
coalitions less stable.
DEBILITATED POLICYMAKING
Both government and opposition figures often myopically view policy
issues through the lens of overarching divisions. With political frames and
alliances locked in, polarization closes off discussions and the compromises
needed to find solutions to the country’s challenges, notably structural issues
in the economy, inequalities, persistent poverty, corruption, and deficits in
education and human capital. Reform has itself been polarizing, as it has been
a rallying call for different groups—for those opposed to BN, for Islamists and
secularists, and for those demanding inclusion and fairness. The very
divisiveness of reform is a serious obstacle to effective policymaking.
Elite political divisions have also fragmented Malaysian society.
Different communities have deeply held resentments and insecurities about
rights, often expressed as open intolerance and systemic exclusion. Racial and
religious minorities are on the front lines, but all communities have been
affected by the dominance of race and religion over other forms of political identity.
Even though interethnic trust remains strong and quotidian relations remain
cordial, more Malaysians live in separate ethnic silos, which furthers
interethnic distancing. The mobilization of divisions has worsened ethnic
relations, particularly since 2018, as UMNO has amplified its polarizing
rhetoric to come back to power.
Overall, Malaysia has lacked the level of ethnic violence seen elsewhere
in South and Southeast Asia. However, given the country’s history of race riots
and the salience of ethnic identity, racial divides remain near the surface. In
recent years, there have been a few attacks on religious sites and reports of
racialized rage, often widely circulated on social media.16
REMEDIAL ACTIONS
Over the past decade, two broad efforts have emerged to redress
polarization in Malaysia. The first has come from political elites themselves
through the opposition’s move toward the center and inclusion of those with
different outlooks. Efforts to adopt an inclusive Malaysian national identity
have been essential in connecting fragmented parties, and approaches that groom
younger leaders with national outlooks and a willingness to engage in new
political arrangements offer the promise of easing polarization. According to
2018 United Nations data, more than half of Malaysia’s voting-age population is
under forty years old, so engaging the youth is essential for ameliorating
divisions and reshaping elite outlooks.17
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